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There have been many discussions recently from philosophers, cognitive scientists, and 
psychologists about group polarization, particularly with regards to political issues and scientific 
issues that have become markers of social identity, such as anthropogenic climate change and 
vaccine hesitancy (McCright and Dunlap, 2011; Schmidt et al., 2018). While the term has been 
used in many different ways, here I will take “group polarization” to refer to a number of related 
phenomena in which members of groups become more extreme in their beliefs, in a direction 
determined by the perceived average strength of belief within the group, after discussion 
(Sunstein, 2002)1. Online and social media environments in particular have received a lot of 
attention in these discussions, both because of people’s increasing reliance on such environments 
for receiving and exchanging information, and because such environments often allow 
individuals to selectively interact with those who are like-minded. My goal here is to argue that 
the group epistemologist can facilitate understanding the kinds of factors that drive group 
polarization in a way that has been overlooked by the existing research. Specifically, I argue that 
 
1 As Bramson et al. (2017) note, the term “group polarization” has been used to refer to a number 
of related but different phenomena. For ease of discussion, I will narrow the sense of the term to 
refer to just the phenomena I describe above and not, for example, the sense in which bipartisan 
political societies have been referred to as “polarized”. 
2 
 
polarization can occur in part because of the ways that members of a group treat the group itself 
(as opposed to an individual member within that group) as a source of information, and in doing 
so makes their own position, as well as that of the group, more extreme. I refer to this as a 
structural factor in driving polarization, as it is a factor that is produced by the general nature of 
the relationship between a group and its members. 
There are, of course, many existing theories positing explanations of how groups 
polarize. When considering the behavior of individuals within a group, there are two broad types 
of factors that are typically taken to drive polarization effects: social and informational. Social 
factors are ones that impact an individual’s belief formation and updating insofar as one engages 
in comparison to other members within one’s group, such that one becomes more extreme in 
one’s beliefs as to maintain a sense of identity within the group, and to avoid rejection by other 
group members. Informational factors, on the other hand, may involve a rational (or at least not 
irrational) response to the quantity and order of information and arguments that a member 
receives from other members within a group, such that one is persuaded by arguments presented 
by other group members that supports the overall position of the group, resulting in an increase 
in the average strength of member belief. 
However, I argue that structural factors can contribute to explanations of polarization that 
occurs in an important subset of groups, namely online and social media groups in which little is 
known about other members within the group, what I refer to as anonymous, semi-anonymous 
and pseudonymous (ASAP) groups. ASAP groups differ from those in which members interact 
with one another face-to-face, or in which members know a lot about the identities of other 
members, in important ways: specifically, there is less social presence in ASAP groups, and as a 
result, members of ASAP groups seek out and interpret information differently, especially with 
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regards to whom they take to be a trustworthy source. This is not to say that such factors operate 
independently of social and informational ones; rather, I argue that structural factors can be more 
prominent drives of polarization in ASAP groups. Furthermore, I argue that structural factors can 
contribute to explanations of polarization not only in ASAP groups, but also in groups generally. 
The paper will proceed as follows. Section 1 provides a summary of some of the most 
widely discussed theories of how social and informational factors cause polarization in groups, 
including online groups. Section 2 outlines some important differences between types of groups 
in terms of the extent to which members know the identity of other members, and argues that for 
ASAP groups in particular, these differences are important for the ways that group members 
exchange and acquire information. I argue that with less information about the identities of other 
group members, individuals will rely much more heavily on other markers of trustworthiness, 
specifically collective member endorsement. Section 3 then argues that the group epistemologist 
can make an important contribution to the discussion by considering how groups can be 
considered as providers of information in their own right, and how the relationship between 
individual member and group can help explain how ASAP groups polarize. Finally, Section 4 
concludes by considering how structural factors can help explain polarization in groups in 
general. 
 
1. Polarization and Identity Transparency 
While many discussions of polarization concern differences in views on social, political, and 
scientific issues at the national level, research on group polarization has shown that as groups can 
come in many different shapes and sizes, so too does polarization occur in many different kinds 
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of groups. That being said, we can distinguish between two main types of groups that have been 
the focus of polarization discussions: groups in which members primarily interact with one 
another face-to-face, and those in which interactions occur online. For example, in terms of face-
to-face groups, Myers and Lamm (1976) discuss the effects that fraternity members have on one 
another in terms of their increasingly conservative viewpoints over the course of their education, 
and Sunstein (2002) considers the ways in which a group of university professors can become 
more extreme in their views concerning affirmative action after discussion. In terms of 
polarization in online groups, the online environment that has dominated discussions is Facebook 
(Guerra et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2014; Bessi et al., 2016; Del Vicario et al., 2016): for instance, in 
addition to studies investigating the conditions that make Facebook groups prone to polarizing 
(e.g. Schmidt et al., 2018; Garibay et al., 2019), there have been several potential remedies 
proposed for polarization on Facebook, which often posit that exposing users to information that 
they would not normally be exposed to can mitigate polarization effects (e.g Munson et al., 2013; 
Garimella et al., 2017; although Bail et al., 2018, suggest that this strategy can backfire). 
Contemporary discussions will often involve both face-to-face and online groups. For example, 
Broncano-Berrocal and Carter (2020) introduce their discussion of group polarization as 
occurring in a “high number of socially relevant phenomena such as jury decisions, political 
debates, financial decision-making, extremism, terrorism, and—of course—interaction with like-
minded people on social media” (3-4). 
In general, the kinds of factors that have been proposed as causes of polarization are the 
same in both face-to-face and online groups. However, discussion of online group polarization 
also involves a distinction between the internal interactions between individuals in a group, and 
the external conditions that help give rise to those conditions (Prasetya and Murata, 2020). For 
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instance, one external explanation that has received a lot of attention is that behind-the-scenes 
algorithms contribute to group polarization by restricting the kinds of information that 
individuals within the group will receive (Sunstein, 2017). The above cases, however, tend to 
focus on the internal conditions, ones which involve discussions between individuals. Here I will 
not have much to say about the external conditions, but will focus on the internal conditions, 
instead. 
As mentioned above, there are two types of internal factors that are typically taken to 
explain group polarization. The first are social factors, of which there are several varieties. For 
instance, social comparison is a process in which a member adjusts the strength of their beliefs 
after comparing their views to those of other members within the group (Burnstein and Vinokur, 
1977; Myers, 1982): in an early meta-analysis, Isenberg (1986) succinctly describes social 
comparison as involving a process in which “people are constantly motivated both to perceive 
and to present themselves in a socially desirable light” and that doing so requires an individual to 
“be continually processing information about how others present themselves, and adjusting his or 
her own self-presentation accordingly” (1142). Additional social factors involve the concern for 
social identity and categorization, wherein an individual’s identification as being a part of the 
relevant in-group results in their becoming more extreme as a result of a perceived need to 
maintain a positive conception of their identity as being a member of that group (Brewer, 1979; 
Turner, 1985; Hogg et al., 1990; Yardi and Boyd, 2010). As Sunstein (2002) puts in, social 
factors in general drive group polarization as a result of “individuals mov[ing] their judgments in 
order to preserve their image to others and their image to themselves” (179). 
As a result of social comparison and concern for identity and categorization, members of 
groups will tend to become more extreme in their relevant beliefs in a direction determined by 
6 
 
the perceived group average. The process of individuals adjusting their beliefs in this way is not 
typically considered to be a rational one: agents will adjust their beliefs in a direction that is 
more extreme than the available evidence warrants in order to help preserve their sense of 
identity and status within the group. While some argue that this process can be rational insofar as 
it is sometimes rational to preserve one’s social identity (Sunstein, 2002) it is nevertheless an 
epistemically irrational response to evidence, in that one’s strength of belief does not accurately 
reflect the available evidence (see Olsson, 2013; Pallavicini et al., 2018).  
In addition to social factors, informational factors have been posited as potential causes 
of group polarization. These factors involve the kind of information a member receives within a 
group, and the way in which one receives it. For example, according to the persuasive arguments 
hypothesis, members of groups become more extreme in their beliefs as a result of being 
presented with arguments from many different members that all support the same view, thus 
making it appear as though the balance of reasons heavily supports one view over another 
(Burnstein and Vinokur, 1977; Sunstein, 2002). Other factors such as information cascades, in 
which consistent initial evidence affects the way in which one interprets potentially contradicting 
evidence one receives later on, can also impact belief forming and updating in ways that result in 
member beliefs becoming more extreme (Anderson and Holt, 1997). Unlike social factors, 
adjusting one’s strength of belief in response to informational factors is not necessarily 
epistemically irrational: if all of the available evidence that one receives is in favor of a particular 
view, for example, it may very well be rational to increase the strength of one’s relevant belief in 
that view. 
So far, we have seen examples of polarization involving groups that differ in terms of 
size, structure, and goals, as well as in terms of whether their members interact face-to-face or in 
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online environments. Here I will introduce an additional characteristic that can distinguish 
different kinds of groups, identity transparency. As I will use the term here, identity transparency 
concerns the extent to which members within a group know the identity of other members, such 
that a group that admits of a high degree of identity transparency will be those in which members 
know a lot about the identities of other members within the group, while groups that have a low 
degree of identity transparency will be those in which members do not know much or anything 
about the identities of other members in the group. There is, of course, a lot of potential variance 
of identity transparency between groups: for example, while neighborhood communities and 
juries may tend to be the kinds of groups that have a high degree of identity transparency, I may 
still know a lot more about my neighbours than I do fellow members of a jury. Some groups may 
also have a higher potential for identity transparency than others. For instance, while I may have 
never introduced myself to my colleagues across the hall, the group of colleagues that we are 
both members of has a high potential for becoming identity transparent, since I am in a position 
to easily come to know more about them. On the other hand, a group of anonymous strangers 
that I interact with online will both have a low degree of identity transparency, as well as a lower 
potential for identity transparency, given that there is no easy way for any of us to learn about the 
identities of one another.  
As we will see in what follows, the degree of identity transparency in both face-to-face 
and online groups can vary significantly. However, as I show in the next section, identity 
transparency tends to be lower in online groups: while there is evidence that some types of online 
conversations, especially political ones, occur most frequently between friends and relatives 
(Tucker et al., 2018), this is certainly not always the case, as the internet offers users the 
opportunity to converse with people of all degrees of familiarity. Specifically, I discuss next an 
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important subclass of online groups in which there is polarization that has a very low degree of 
identity transparency. 
2. Online, Social Media, and ASAP Groups 
Call a group an anonymous, semi-anonymous, or pseudonymous (ASAP) group just in case it is a 
group in which the identities of members are either not known to one another (e.g. in which all 
members of the group are anonymous), are known only in some limited capacity, or are only 
known to each other only on the basis of pseudonym. As a result of the potential for anonymity, 
such groups will tend to have very low degrees of identity transparency. While it is not necessary 
that such groups occur in online environments, I take it that they are most commonly found 
online: for example, message board websites (e.g. Reddit), and social media in which a user’s 
identity is not required in order to participate in group discussion (e.g. Twitter) are environments 
in which one can find ASAP groups. In contrast, the kinds of face-to-face groups provided as 
examples above (e.g. juries, groups of community members, colleagues, etc.) will generally fall 
outside of this category. This is not to say that all online groups are ASAP groups: as mentioned 
above, some online groups can have high degrees of identity transparency (e.g. when one 
discusses political issues with family and friends), and there may very well be face-to-face 
groups in which members know little to nothing about one another (e.g. the group of criminals in 
Quentin Tarantino’s Reservoir Dogs who identify themselves via color-coded pseudonyms). 
Nevertheless, here I will focus on ASAP groups that occur in online environments. My argument 
here is that the differences between ASAP groups and face-to-face groups (along with other 
groups that have high degrees of identity transparency) are important when considering how 
groups polarize. To illustrate, I will begin by surveying some of the research on the differences 
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between face-to-face (FtF) communication and computer-mediated communication (CMC) 
(Siegel et al., 1986; Valacich et al., 1994; Walther and Parks, 2002; Walther, 2011).  
Some of the major questions in CMC research concern how personal interactions differ 
between computer-mediated environments and face-to-face environments, and especially how 
the effects of online anonymity impact adherence to social norms (Abrams et al., 1990; Marino 
et al., 2016). One important difference pertains to the ways in which people seek out and 
interpret information from online groups as compared to face-to-face groups. For instance, Kane 
et al. (2014) argue that there is reason to believe that the ways individuals interact with others 
online “may bear little connection to offline social relationships” (286), in that face-to-face group 
discussions tend to be more goal-oriented, and involve more interpersonal deliberation. Kane and 
Fichman (2009) also argue that while collaborative online projects like Wikipedia involve the 
contribution of the work of many individual members, it does not involve the kind of discussion 
and deliberation between members that one will tend to find in face-to-face groups. Instead, they 
argue that the ways that individuals seek out information from face-to-face groups tend to 
involve interactions and discussions with other individuals, whereas when seeking information 
online one will tend to rely less on interpersonal deliberation and more on aggregate member 
endorsement (Kane and Fichman 2009). This kind of behavior is especially prevalent when 
making decisions about purchasing products: if I were to seek out information from people in 
face-to-face groups, I would likely consult a number of different people, and discuss their 
choices with them. In online groups, however, I am much more likely to simply look for the 
product with the highest aggregate rating (ibid.). 
A key reason for the difference for the way that individuals acquire information when 
face-to-face as opposed to online is that there is less social presence in online environments, 
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where social presence is defined as “the degree to which people establish warm and personal 
connections with each other in a communication setting” (Sia et al., 2002: 73; see also Short et 
al., 1976). As Sia et al. (2002) argue, social presence is important in determining the ways in 
which individuals seek out and interpret information from others, and is characterized by three 
types of communication cues: verbal cues that pertain to tone, volume, and rate of speech (see 
also Cook and Lallijee, 1972; Daft et al., 1987; McGrath, 1984); visual cues, including facial 
expressions and body language; and textual cues, which pertain to the information included in 
written text. Importantly, Sia et al. argue that computer-mediated communication generally 
involves lower social presence than face-to-face communication (see also Poole and Jackson, 
1993), and that anonymity lowers it further. One reason is that “communication cues that 
typically yield higher social presence are those that convey immediacy” (where “immediacy” is 
defined as “the psychological distance between people who are communicating”), and the kinds 
of communication cues that one receives in face-to-face communication – e.g. verbal and visual 
cues – are ones that convey immediacy, whereas the cues available in anonymous computer-
mediated communication – e.g. textual cues – do not (Sia et al., 2002: 74). 
Lower social presence in online communication has important consequences for thinking 
about polarization. The first is that in online settings in which one can be anonymous, individuals 
are more open about sharing their views, presumably because they do not feel apprehensive 
about being criticized for them (Nunamaker et al., 1991). Interestingly, Sia et al. (2002) argue 
that a lack of apprehension will result in the production of more novel arguments in ASAP 
groups, which will in turn result in greater polarization effects, as “people tend to focus on 
arguments rather than presenters”, and will thus try to outdo other members in a process of “one-
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upmanship”, where members defend views that are more extreme in accordance with the 
perceived values of the group (78). 
Secondly, and more importantly for my purposes here, is that with lower social presence 
and fewer communication cues, individuals in online groups will look to different types of 
markers of trustworthiness than in face-to-face groups. As mentioned above, one of the most 
prominent additional cues comes in the form of endorsement: this may come in the form of 
explicit endorsement markers – e.g. “likes”, “hearts”, or “upvotes” (Willemsen et al., 2012) – or 
more indirect cues, such as the number of connections that one has within a given network – e.g. 
the number of “friends” one has on a social media network (Lim and Van Der Heide, 2015). In 
general, information that has been highly endorsed is more readily accepted, and members who 
are highly endorsed by other members tend to be seen as more trustworthy (Willemsen et al. 
2012)2.  
The reliance on endorsement as a marker of trustworthiness is the result of one having 
only limited social cues upon which to evaluate others. Metzger et al. (2010), for instance, found 
that “participants developed strategies to assess a source’s credibility as best they could” (421), 
given both the overall dearth of information about other members, and the concern that what 
information might be available – say, in the form of information presented on user-generated 
 
2 This is not to say that endorsement correlates perfectly with perceived trustworthiness. 
Willemsen et al. (2012), for example, argue that individuals evaluating the trustworthiness of 
others online face the “authenticity dilemma”: while being very highly endorsed is taken to be a 
sign of trustworthiness, universal endorsement is often taken to be a sign of untrustworthiness 
and manipulation. 
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profiles – could be manipulated and curated by the members themselves. In order to evaluate the 
credibility of other members, then, individuals will tend to employ what Walther et al. (2009) 
call “warranting theory”: in determining the credibility of others, individuals will seek out 
credentials that are the least susceptible to manipulation. In online environments, such 
credentials are most readily available in the form of aggregate ratings from the group: this is 
because as information aggregates it becomes more and more difficult to manipulate, and any 
potential subjective biases in the ratings of individuals and information will have less of an effect 
on endorsement overall (Flanagin and Metzger, 2013). Aggregate endorsement can also be taken 
to be a marker of expertise, with individuals endorsed by members being deemed more credible 
than those who are self-proclaimed experts (Willemsen et al., 2012). 
What research on communication and social cues in online communication suggests, 
then, is that without the kinds of social cues one can rely on to help assess credibility in face-to-
face interactions, one’s interactions with others in online groups will tend to be mediated in 
different ways, with there being an especially significant role for endorsement. The extent to 
which some information or individual is endorsed, however, is something that is not determined 
at the level of the individual, but is instead determined at the level of the group: that information 
one provides has received a significant amount of “likes” or “hearts” is not information that is 
provided by an individual member, but is instead the result of an aggregate of actions from 
multiple members. That this is the case implies that there is an important role that the 
information one receives from the group itself plays in the way that individual members form 
and update beliefs in online environments. In the next section I argue that this relationship 
between individual member and group implies that there are additional structural factors that can 
cause polarization in ASAP groups. 
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3. Structural Polarization in ASAP Groups 
In this section I argue that group polarization in ASAP groups can come about at least in 
part because of the relationship between members of the group and the group itself, specifically 
when members appeal to groups as sources of information. For this argument to be successful I 
will defend three views: first, that online groups themselves (in addition to individual members 
within a group) can be sources of information; second, that one way that online and ASAP 
groups can provide information is via the collective endorsement of its members; and third, that 
relying on and contributing to that endorsement makes it more likely that members within the 
group will become more extreme in their beliefs. Defending these views will require looking in 
more detail at some recent work concerning the epistemology of groups. 
3.1 Online Groups as Sources of Information 
The first view that needs defending is that online groups, in addition to individual 
members of such groups, can be sources of information. Questions concerning how groups can 
possess beliefs and knowledge, as well as how they can make assertions and be sources of 
testimony, have been matters of considerable discussion in recent work in social epistemology. 
One of the main motivations for positing that groups can be sources of information pertains to 
common practices of information-seeking. For example, we seek out the national weather service 
to form beliefs about what the weather will be like tomorrow; we seek out NASA to get the latest 
news on exoplanet discoveries; we seek out laboratories to learn about new developments in drug 
research; etc. (Tollefsen, 2007; Fricker, 2012; Lackey, 2018). The manner in which groups 
provide information will depend on its structure: for instance, groups might be structured in such 
a way that an individual spokesperson delivers information on the group’s behalf (Lackey, 
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2018), or perhaps members of a group might all contribute to a study or otherwise collaborate on 
a larger project (Fricker, 2012), etc. 
What information a group can provide is a matter of debate in the epistemology of 
groups. In general, the information that a group can provide is determined by its members; that 
being said, there are two competing theories about how the states and actions of a group’s 
members determine those of the group itself. According to the summativist3, a group provides 
information that p just in case most or all of its members provide or are in a position to provide 
that information (Lackey, 2014). For example, a group might take a vote among its members as 
to its position on p and release a statement to that effect, in which case the group provides 
information that p in virtue of the fact that most or all of its members provide that information as 
well. According to the non-summativist, a group can provide information that few or none of its 
members provide or are in a position to provide (Tollefsen, 2007). For example, in a group of 
individuals collaborating on a large project it can be the case that while all of the individuals 
contribute towards figuring out that p, only very few of them are actually in a position to provide 
the information that p. I will not here take a stance on the theoretical debate between the 
summativist and non-summativist views. What is important for my purposes is that however we 
think about groups as being able to provide information, the information that a group provides is 
determined, in some way, by its members. 
 
3 Note that the terms “summativism” and “non-summativism” are used to identify a number of 
different positions within group epistemology, both in terms of group doxastic and epistemic 
states, as well as group actions. The senses in which I am using the terms here comes from 
discussions of group assertion and testimony (Tollefsen, 2007; Lackey, 2014). 
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It is becoming increasingly common for individuals to seek information from social 
media groups. For instance, a 2018 PEW Research Center study found that 20% of Americans 
reported that they often use social media as a source of news, surpassing those who often get 
their news from newspapers (PEW, 2018). Individuals seem to be able to acquire information 
from online and social media groups in different ways. For instance, one might treat an online 
group as an environment in which to seek out information from other individuals, e.g. I might 
use Twitter to learn about some recent event in the news, but in doing so I use Twitter as a 
platform through which I can communicate with other individuals. In these cases, I am still 
relying on individuals for information, they just happen to be individuals that are members of the 
same group as me. It also seems that I can, however, treat online and social media groups as 
sources of information in their own right. This is perhaps most clear in the case of sites like 
Wikipedia, where information is provided as the result of collaboration amongst many 
individuals: when one treats a Wikipedia entry as a source of information, then, one is relying 
not on any individual agent, but a group (Tollefsen 2009). 
While there is much to be said about these and related debates in the epistemology of 
groups, what we can conclude from this section is that there is a good theoretical basis for 
thinking that groups can be sources of information or, at the very least, that groups are treated as 
sources of information. With that being said, I turn to the next view in need of defense, namely 
that one way in which groups can provide information is via aggregate member endorsement. 
3.2. Aggregate Endorsement as Group Information 
Consider the following example of a case in which one might acquire information from an online 
group: 
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Healthy Food News: Robin is a member of the “Healthy Food News” Facebook group, 
and visits it often to get the latest news about healthy food. One day, she sees a highly 
endorsed post declaring that “açai berries are a new superfood”, and that they are so good 
for you because “they are full of antioxidants”. Robin then comes to believe that açai 
berries are a new superfood, and adds her endorsement to the post. Later, when someone 
questions whether açai berries are really all they are hyped up to be, Robin makes a post 
responding that they are great because of how many antioxidants they have. Other 
members within the group respond similarly, resulting in a group consisting of members 
who are firm believers in the benefits of açai berries. 
We have seen that while groups may provide information via the collaboration of individuals, or 
just as the product of information provided by the majority of its members, the above example 
illustrates what I argue is a common additional way in which online groups can provide 
information, namely via the collective endorsement of its members4. We should think that highly 
endorsed information is provided by the group (in addition to the individual member) for two 
reasons: first, that collective endorsement is akin to a kind of voting, where a group’s position is 
determined by the collective actions of its members; and second, what information one is able to 
receive within the group is a product of how highly endorsed it is, a consequence being that the 
group itself is a source of that information. I defend these views in turn. 
 
4 I do not take these to exhaust the ways in which one can acquire information from online 
groups. For instance, such groups can provide information in the form of group mandates, rules, 
announcements, and FAQs, etc. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. 
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First, we have seen above that endorsement is taken by online users to be a particularly 
salient mark of trustworthiness, given the general lack of relevant available communication cues 
in online environments. However, given that collective member endorsement is a phenomenon 
that occurs at the level of the group, information that is accepted because it is highly endorsed is 
not necessarily accepted solely on the basis of any characteristics of the individual who initially 
provides that information, but rather because of a characteristic of the group. In this way, we can 
conceive of the group itself as being a provider of the relevant information5. Consider again one 
of the ways that groups can be sources of information mentioned above, namely in terms of 
taking a vote of the membership. While a certain motion may be proposed by an individual 
member of that group, that the majority of members of that group approve of it results in it being 
the position of the group itself. Collective endorsement can then be seen as a kind of voting: that 
a significant number of members have shown their approval of some information results in that 
information being the position of the group, as well. When that information is displayed along 
with the fact that it has been so highly endorsed, then, is a way in which a group can be said to 
also be providing that information. 
 
5 Note that in accepting some highly endorsed information one may very well also take the 
characteristics of the initial provider of that information into account, especially if relevant facts 
about that person’s identity is known (e.g. if they are a known expert on a given matter). 
However, when this information is absent (as will often be the case in ASAP groups), 
characteristics of the initial provider of information will play less of a role in one’s accepting that 
information. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting I clarify this point. 
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The second reason to think that highly endorsed information is information one acquires 
from the group, is that endorsement determines which information one will be exposed to in said 
group. That the information one receives is determined by group endorsement is a standard 
feature of social media sites like Facebook and Twitter: for example, Facebook’s algorithms 
determine which stories appear on one’s timeline at least in part due to “the number of 
comments, likes and reactions a post receives and what kind of story it is”6, and Twitter’s 
algorithms select “each Tweet using a variety of signals, including how popular it is and how 
people in your network are interacting with it”7. Again, the fact that what information is 
disseminated to members is determined by the group-level phenomenon of collective member 
endorsement is then another reason to think that said information is provided by the group itself. 
To say that when information is highly endorsed that it is thereby information presented 
by the group is not to remove the need for the input of any individual member. For example, in 
the Healthy Food News case, there was an individual member who was responsible for making 
the initial post asserting that açai berries were a superfood. However, given the lack of 
communication cues and low degree of identity transparency, Robin would have little to go on if 
she were to receive that information from the individual. That the information is highly endorsed, 
however, not only made it possible for Robin to receive it in the first place, but provides 
trustworthiness cues that provides her with a good basis for accepting it. Given that she knows 
little or nothing about the individual providing the information implies that she is not relying on 
that individual for said information, but is instead relying on the group itself. 
 
6 https://www.facebook.com/help/166738576721085 
7 https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/twitter-timeline 
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What this discussion shows is how work from group epistemology can help us make 
sense of how online groups can provide information as a product of collective member 
endorsement. As we saw above, collective action on the part of individuals within a group can 
result in the group providing information that would not be able to be provided by any individual 
member within the group. Given the role that endorsement plays in ASAP group as a marker of 
trustworthiness in the absence of other cues, then, it seems that in such groups, members will 
often rely on collective member endorsement as a way to acquire information from the group. 
Next, to show how such views can result in group polarization, we need to look at the 
relationship between members and groups to see how receiving information from groups via 
collective member endorsement, while also contributing to it, can result in polarization effects. 
3.3 Collective Member Endorsement and Group Polarization 
Reliance on groups as a source of information in the form of aggregate endorsement 
demonstrates an important kind of relationship that occurs within groups, namely one that occurs 
between a member and the group itself. To see how this relationship can result in group 
polarization, we need to recognize how members both acquire information from and contribute 
to the information that is provided by a group. Consider again the Healthy Food News case: the 
view that açai berries are a superfood because they are high in antioxidants is highly endorsed by 
the members of the group, and thus when Robin checks the group, she will both be more likely to 
be exposed to that information because it has been so highly endorsed (as we saw above, social 
media tend to organize information such that highly endorsed information is more prominently 
displayed) and because in online environments with fewer trustworthiness cues, will be more 
likely to accept that information on the basis of that endorsement. If Robin acquires a new belief 
that açai berries are a superfood, then she will contribute to the potential polarization of the 
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group, in that the average strength of belief in the relevant matter will increase. If this is a belief 
that Robin already held previously, then it seems likely that she would increase the strength of 
her belief on the basis of that endorsement, as one learning that one’s beliefs are widely 
approved of is likely to make one more confident that one is correct (Del Vicario et al., 2016; 
Bessi et al., 2016). Again, an important part of how Robin acquires or updates her belief is due to 
the relationship between her and the group itself: that she receives the information at all is the 
result of the collective endorsement of the members, and part of the reason why she accepts the 
information is because it has been so highly endorsed.  
At the same time, we have seen that what information a group can provide is a function 
of the views and actions of its members. As one receives information from a group via collective 
member endorsement, then, so too can a member contribute to that endorsement. Indeed, this 
seems to often be what occurs when considering endorsement behavior in social media groups. 
For instance, Brandtzaeg and Haugstveit (2014) found that one of the main motivations behind 
Facebook users “liking” posts in groups with humanitarian causes was that the content was 
something that they wanted to share with others, while Huang (2013) found similar results when 
users were interacting with a brand’s Facebook group, and Guy et al. (2016) found that across 
multiple different kinds of social media platforms that the motivation for liking behavior was 
dominated by factors such as “I learn something from it” and “I agree with it”. If these are the 
kinds of motivations behind endorsement behavior, then it seems that when acquiring 
information from highly endorsed posts one will likely contribute one’s endorsement to it, so 
long as it is something that the user agrees with or wants to disseminate to others.  
By relying on and contributing to group endorsement, then, a member of a group can 
both increase polarization by acquiring or strengthening her own belief, as well as by making it 
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more likely that other members will do this same: after all, by contributing to group endorsement 
other members will be more likely to be presented with that information, and with it being even 
more highly endorsed such members will interpret it as being more trustworthy. When this 
process occurs with multiple members of the group – say, when more members look at and 
subsequently endorse the same post – polarization effects can occur: as a group endorses a view 
more and more strongly, more and more members will in turn either believe that information or 
believe it more strongly. As a result, the average strength of belief of members within a group 
will tend to become more extreme, solely by relying on a group as a source of information.  
Furthermore, seeking out information from groups in the way described here can result in 
additional behaviors that can reinforce polarizing effects. For example, while Robin’s 
contributing her own endorsement in the Healthy Food News case is by itself enough to 
contribute to the polarization of the group, her finding the relevant information trustworthy 
results in her expressing her belief and defending it in response to challenges, which can in turn 
make it seem more trustworthy, resulting in other members increasing the strengths of their 
respective beliefs. While these actions need not always occur, they can be the result of a process 
that started with a member merely relying on, and subsequently contributing to, information 
acquired from a group. Polarization can occur, then, as a result of the basic fact that groups are 
structured such that group views are constituted by member views and actions, and that members 
seek out information from those groups. 
Here, then, is a summary of the main argument: in addition to social and informational 
factors, structural factors contribute to group polarization in ASAP groups. This is because in 
such groups the low degree of identity transparency and lack of communication cues forces 
individuals to rely on alternative markers of trustworthiness, the most prominent being collective 
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member endorsement. However, since collective member endorsement is a phenomenon that 
occurs at the level of the group and not the individual, the group itself ought to be considered as 
the source of the relevant information. Furthermore, because of the ways in which members 
interpret and contribute to group endorsement, highly endorsed information is likely to spread 
and to increase the confidence in members’ beliefs, a process that can result in an overall 
increase in the average strength of belief in the relevant information. Therefore, the relationship 
between member and group, and not just the relationships between individual members, is an 
important one to consider when explaining group polarization. 
I have considered this argument as applying to ASAP groups because such groups are 
ones in which reliance on groups as sources of information is arguably more prevalent than in 
other types of groups. That being said, to conclude I will consider how we might apply the 
argument I have developed here to groups in general. In doing so, I will consider how structural 
factors relate to the social and informational factors discussed above. 
 
4. Structural Polarization in General 
With lower social presence and fewer trustworthiness cues in ASAP groups, turning to groups as 
providers of information via collective member endorsement makes sense as a way to help 
individuals determine whether they should accept a given piece of information. There is reason 
to think, however, that members will appeal to groups as a source of information even in face-to-
face groups, and even groups with high degrees of identity transparency. For example, when 
trying to decide on a verdict, members of a jury will periodically take anonymous votes to get a 
sense of whether the group is leaning towards a verdict of guilty or innocent. Information 
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received from the group in this way can influence the degree to which a jury member holds their 
relevant belief, and in turn can affect the view of the group. Thus, it is not only interactions 
between jurors, but also interactions between individual jurors and the jury as a group that can 
drive polarization. 
This is not to say that structural factors are the sole, or even most prominent drivers of 
polarization in groups, generally speaking. However, since structural factors appeal to basic 
relationships between groups and the members that comprise them, there is reason to think that 
they will have some role to play in polarization of any type of group, ASAP or otherwise. One 
consequence of the view that structural factors play a role in group polarization is that it may be 
a basic feature of groups that are treated as a source of information by their members that they 
will tend to polarize, regardless of the ways in which individual members interact with one 
another. In contrast, existing studies that model polarization in theoretical groups are ones in 
which polarization occurs as the result of the exchange of information between individual 
members, and are often modelled in such a way that every member communicates with every 
other member (see Olsson, 2013; Pallavicini et al., 2018; Singer et al., 2019). If what I have 
argued for here is correct, though, then there are factors that can cause polarization that do not 
require there to be any discussion between members: instead, it can occur solely as the result of 
members both contributing to the position of the group and relying on the group itself as a source 
of information. Indeed, such factors are important to consider when modelling the kinds of 
groups that have been my main focus here: while models of Bayesian agents are obviously 
idealizations, the nature of such models as consisting of individuals constantly sharing 
information with one another fails to capture the nature of ASAP and social media groups, where 
information is not accepted directly from other individual group members, but only insofar as it 
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receives the endorsement of the group. Much of the discussion in such groups, then, may be 
better described as existing between member and group, and not between individual members. 
This is not to say that structural factors necessarily operate independently of social and 
informational factors. Indeed, as mentioned above, one way in which social and structural factors 
may work together is in juries, wherein individual jurors not only share information with each 
other, but periodically check in with the group, as well, primarily as a way of expediting the 
process of reaching an agreement: in such a case an individual juror may adjust their belief both 
on the basis of feedback from individuals and the group. Similarly, Myers (1978) found that 
exposing experimental participants to the average of group judgments had polarizing effects: 
while Myers postulated that social factors were driving polarization, in that participants wanted 
to make sure that they adjusted their views in order to be perceived favorably by others, we can 
see that one of the means to making such a social comparison may be via receiving information 
from the group. This may especially be the case when the group of which one is a member is 
particularly important to one’s political or social identity: for example, if I am a member of a 
group with a particular political orientation, the fact that the aggregate of member judgments is 
strongly in favor of a certain stance on a given issue may cause me to strengthen my belief 
accordingly, in order to be perceived favorably by the group. 
Structural factors, then, may very well operate alongside or reinforce social factors. 
However, in introducing the concept of ASAP groups, I have attempted to identify a class of 
cases in which social factors are likely to play a much less significant role in polarization, given 
that such groups have a low degree of identity transparency and are not necessarily focused on 
any topic that is a maker of social identity. In these cases, then, I have argued that information 
from the group in the form of aggregate member endorsement is employed as a trustworthiness 
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cue, and not necessarily a means of social comparison. Again, there will certainly be cases in 
which such information can play both roles, as is demonstrated in jury cases and from 
experimental results. 
It should also be noted that appealing to a group for information is not necessarily a bad 
thing, and that the potentially beneficial effects of exposing individuals to average group 
responses have also been recognized in other areas of study, specifically in terms of optimal 
decision-making. For instance, the Delphi method of opinion aggregation (Linstone and Turoff, 
1975) involves panels of experts anonymously answering questions, providing feedback to the 
responses of others, and being given information about the median of responses from other 
participants, with the idea that the anonymity afforded to group members will reduce any 
perceived social pressures, and that information about median group response can help 
individual members and the group as a whole reach better judgments. Of course, a key difference 
between structured decision-making cases and the kinds of ASAP and online groups that I 
describe here is that the latter occur organically and in ways that are not necessarily goal 
oriented, and that participants in the former are well-aware of the aims of explicitly appealing to 
information provided by the group. Thus, while it has been recognized that average or aggregate 
group judgment can be a tool to expedite and facilitate decision making, what discussions of 
structural factors can highlight is how this information can play a different role in ASAP and 
online groups, and how such factors can drive polarization. 
Structural factors also need not operate independent of informational factors: as groups 
can be sources of information it stands to reason that they can play a role in the effects of 
informational factors on polarization. For example, information provided by the group may 
contribute to information cascades: aggregate member views may be considered an additional 
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piece of information that will lead one to downplay the effect of later, conflicting information; 
furthermore, one may be presented with group endorsement that becomes increasingly large with 
each additional contribution of consistent information, thus providing a way in which 
information cascades could occur primarily by relying on group information8. Of course, 
information cascades do not have to involve any explicit appeal to the group for information, and 
do not require appealing to any specific average or aggregate of member views. Furthermore, 
information acquired from groups need not be presented to one in a sequential manner: one can 
simply receive highly endorsed information from the group immediately without having acquired 
any other information beforehand. While informational factors like information cascades then 
appeal to information received from individuals first and foremost, structural factors do not. In 
general, then, while groups themselves can play a role in both social and informational drivers of 
polarization, given that there are classes of groups that polarize where such factors are much less 
significant gives us reason to think that structural factors are not a mere subset of either. 
While much has been said about group polarization, my goal here has been to show that 
such discussions tend to focus on the group as merely a way to cordon off a collection of 
individuals, and not as something that is capable of providing information in its own right. By 
looking at work from the epistemology of groups, however, we can see how members of groups 
do, in fact, rely on groups for information, and how the relationship between group and member 
can contribute to group polarization. I have argued that while these effects are perhaps most 
prominent in ASAP groups in particular, and groups with low degrees of identity transparency 
 
8 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this interpretation of information cascades, and for 
suggesting the comparison in the first place. 
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more generally, that we should also consider structural factors as potential contributors to group 
polarization regardless of the type of group involved9. 
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